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This article is a thought experiment, or maybe a nightmare, about the inter-
section of freedom of contract and the trials that have not vanished. Could con-
tracting parties effectively agree in advance of a dispute that any litigation of the
case will comply with certain rules? Would such an agreement be enforced even
in a contract of adhesion? If so, parties with sufficient bargaining leverage could
design away many of the characteristics of litigation that they find unappealing
without the need to resort to private processes. The result: a designer trial with the
procedural deck stacked in favor of the party with the greatest pre-dispute bargain-
ing power.
Imagine a contract between a consumer or employee and an institutional re-
peat player that contains the following provision on the signature page.
Choice of Forum. Choice of Law. Pre-Trial Proceedings. Trial
Process. Jury Trial Waiver. In any dispute arising out of, or related to
this contract, because litigation can be costly and time consuming, Acme
Corporation and I agree as follows:
1. Acme Corporation and I both waive a trial by jury of any or all dis-
putes, claims, or controversies arising from, or relating to, this contract or
the relationships which result from this contract, and whether brought as
claims or counterclaims (hereinafter "such disputes").
2. Acme Corporation and I both agree that any suit based on such dis-
putes shall be brought only in a state or federal court of general jurisdic-
tion in X County, X State, and the laws of X State shall apply to all is-
sues arising under, or related to, this contract.
3. Acme Corporation and I both agree that in any suit based on such dis-
putes, the following limitations on discovery will apply: all discovery
shall be completed not later than six months after defendant appears in
the case; no party may send more than ten interrogatories to any other
party; and any discovery materials produced by Me or Acme Corporation
will be maintained as confidential and returned to the party producing the
material at the conclusion of the litigation.
4. Acme Corporation and I both agree that in any suit based on such dis-
putes, we will not join our claims with those of any other party and will
not seek to represent a class of persons similarly situated.
5. Acme Corporation and I both agree that we will not make any public
statement regarding such dispute.
* Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law.
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6. Acme Corporation and I both agree that should there be a trial regard-
ing such dispute, each party shall be limited to three hours to present its
case in chief and one hour to present any rebuttal evidence.
7. Acme Corporation and I both agree that the only expert(s) who may
testify at the trial of such dispute will be selected by the court and that the
expert(s)' fees shall be taxed as costs.
8. Acme Corporation and I both agree that the judgment of the trial court
regarding such dispute shall be final, and neither party will appeal the
judgment on any ground. The trial judge will not make findings of fact
and conclusions of law.
1
9. Acme Corporation and I both agree that at the conclusion of the litiga-
tion of any such dispute, we will file a joint motion asking that the
court's record be sealed in all respects, except that the docket sheet may
reflect that a suit was filed and include the names of the parties.
By initialing here, I indicate that I have read and that I understand this
paragraph.
Such a clause could appear in a contract with an employer, a bank, a cell
phone company, an internet service provider, a credit card company, a stock bro-
ker, a landlord, a doctor, a hospital, a school, a gym, a travel agency or even an
exterminator. With this clause, a potential institutional litigant has obtained many
of the features that normally motivate businesses to require arbitration, but with-
out the expense of arbitration fees, and without the necessity to litigate the validity
of the arbitration clause or to sue to enforce an arbitrator's decision.
The contracting party who is a repeat player can tailor the litigation contract
to suit its probable position in litigation. If the institutional party predicts that it
would likely appear in court as a defendant, it can make choices that decrease the
out-of-pocket cost of litigation, eliminate the threat of class actions, avoid a jury
trial, and limit the bad publicity and proliferation of litigation made possible by
public disputes. In addition, the contracting future defendant can include provi-
sions likely to make it harder for the party with the burden of proof to prevail,
such as limiting discovery and the presentation of evidence. If the institutional
party predicts that it would likely appear in court as a plaintiff but is likely to be in
a position in which it has pre-suit access to information, it will still want to limit
discovery, speed the dispute resolution process, avoid publicity, and eliminate the
jury. In either case, it can choose a favorable forum and the most attractive avail-
able law. 2 If courts follow precedent established in arbitration and jury waiver
cases, they would likely enforce the contract.
1. This provision might not be enforceable in federal court where Rule 52(a) requires findings and
conclusions, but could be valid in a number of state systems where findings and conclusions form a
basis for appeal rather than an explanation of the court's reasoning. See, e.g., TEX. R. CIv. P. 296
(request for findings and conclusions follows judgment).
2. Some have proposed that contracting parties should be permitted to craft designer law as well.
See Frank Partnoy, Synthetic Common Law, 53 U. KAN. L. REv. 281 (2005).
[Vol. 2006
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In the context of arbitration clauses, courts have enthusiastically endorsed
freedom of contract, particularly when those contracts result in a perceived effi-
ciency gain for the courts themselves. They have dismissed the differences be-
tween court procedures and arbitration procedures as insignificant unless the cho-
sen arbitration procedures effectively deny a remedy or are unconscionable under
state contract law.3 Yet restricting procedural choice within the public court sys-
tem has implications beyond those of opting out of the system entirely. Ulti-
mately, contractual modifications to court processes raise the issue of the extent
and importance of the public purposes of the judicial system.
This article will begin to explore the parameters and policy implications of
the Designer Trial. Part I will examine the most litigated area of contractual trial
design: the waiver of trial by jury. It will consider the reasons that jury waivers
are enforced and the expansion of the trend to enforce them. Part II will discuss
the kinds of features that, consistent with those reasons, could be added to the
designer trial. Part III will consider the policy issues implicated by allowing such
contracts, including the impact on the role of trials as a public good and the func-
tion of judges and judicial discretion.
I. THE DESIGN BEGINS: CHOOSING THE JUDGE, REJECTING THE JURY
A. The Importance of the Civil Jury
It would be hard to overstate the importance of the jury in U.S. law. At the
federal level, the right to a jury trial in civil cases is protected by the Seventh
Amendment.4 Each of the fifty states also has a right to jury trial guaranteed by
constitution or statute. 5 The jury serves multiple roles. As a matter of procedural
black letter law, the jurors are the finders of fact at trial. Guided by the judge's
explanation of the law contained in the jury instructions, the jurors apply the law
to the facts as they find them and render a verdict in the case.
As a political institution, the jury serves two functions that are relevant here:
it serves as a check on the power of the less democratic judge, and it expresses
community values and experience by incorporating them into legal decision mak-
ing. As a part of democratic self-government, the jury is designed to serve the
people by checking the judge "much as the legislature was to check the executive,
the House to check the Senate, and the states to check the national government."
6
Early in the debate over the federal constitution, for example, the issue of the
jury's political role loomed large:
3. For general discussions of the evolution of the Supreme Court's treatment of the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act and its growing preference for arbitration, see IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION
LAW 92-155 (1992); Richard M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer Con-
tracts: A Call for Reform, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1237, 1243-46 (2001); Paul H. Haagen, New Wineskins
for New Wine: The Need to Encourage Fairness in Mandatory Arbitration, 40 ARIz. L. REV. 1039,
1045-48 (1998); Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's
Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 644-74 (1996).
4. U.S. CONsT. amend. VII. See also FED. R. CIv. P. 38(a).
5. See Ellen E. Sward, Legislative Courts, Article 111, and the Seventh Amendment, 77 N.C. L. REV.
1037, 1040 n.ll (1999).
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Juries are constantly and frequently drawn from the body of the people,
and freemen of the country; and by holding the jury's right to return a
general verdict in all cases sacred, we secure to the people at large, their
just and rightful controul [sic] in the judicial department. . . . [T]he de-
mocratic branch of the legislature and the jury trial are the means of ef-
fective and popular control.7
It is, therefore, not surprising that many of our modem debates about proce-
dural devices are debates about the proper allocation of power between the judge
and the jury.8 The civil jury also affects the allocation of power among the
branches of government. "Although the civil jury is of course an organ of gov-
ernment, it nonetheless has an antistatist quality because it allows the people to
decide matters differently than the other institutions of government might wish." 9
The jury's role in infusing the trial process with community values is both
subtle and pervasive. First, in many cases the jury's decision is explicitly
value-laden. For example, decisions such as whether a party's actions were rea-
sonable, whether a product's social utility exceeds its risk, whether a contract term
was unconscionable, whether a breach of contract should be excused, or whether a
police officer's use of force was excessive, are not value-neutral inquiries into
historical fact. The answers to these questions depend on societal norms, supplied
by the jury. 10 Second, jurors apply community norms, in the form of each juror's
experience of life in the community, in evaluating the evidence presented.'1 For
example, jurors decide what witnesses they believe and do not believe, and which
party's story is more consistent with their understanding of reality. 12 This func-
tion is enhanced when the jury reflects the broader community. "The jury is the
most effective instrument for incorporating the diverse ethnic, economic, reli-
gious, and social elements of American society into the justice system."'' 3
7. See Stephen C. Yeazell, The New Jury and the Ancient Jury Conflict, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 87,
112-13 (citations omitted).
8. "The vanishing trial is, in many regards, the vanishing jury. Power and discretion have shifted
away from the jury and more and more now is in the hands of the judge. To put it another way, the
long-term historical development is to shift decision making from amateurs to professionals." Law-
rence M. Friedman, The Day Before Trials Vanished, I J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 689, 698 (2004).
9. OSCAR G. CHASE, LAW, CULTURE, AND RrTUAL 56 (2005).
10. See Stephen C. Yeazell, Getting What We Asked For, Getting What We Paid For, and Not Liking
What We Got: The Vanishing Civil Trial, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 943,966 (2004) ("[T]here's a
strong historical case to be made for law reform through jury law making.... The important thing
about these changes is that they evolved from long experience of juries confronting facts in which the
commonsense of justice departed from that dispensed by law-and law yielded. In a world where
trials are increasingly rare, we lose some analogous opportunities for evolutionary law making.").
11. See generally Elizabeth G. Thornburg, The Power and the Process: Instructions and the Civil
Jury, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1837, 1857-66 (1998).
12. Id.
13. Stephan Landsman, So What? Possible Implications of the Vanishing Trial Phenomenon, 1 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 973,974 (2004).
[Vol. 2006
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B. Waiver of the Right to Jury Trial
Despite the central function of the jury in the American judicial system, the
parties can eliminate the jury's role.14 If neither of the parties to a common law
action chooses to request a jury trial, the right to jury can be waived by procedural
default.' 5  Although the jury protects public values, the right to a jury trial is
treated as a private right and can be waived by the parties through agreement or
through inaction during the course of the lawsuit. This is true of other due process
rights as well.
16
Parties may also waive their right to a jury trial by signing a pre-litigation
contract with a waiver provision in it.' 7 However, these waivers are only enforced
if they are knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. 18 In deciding whether the waiver
was intentional, courts consider factors such as the conspicuousness of the waiver
clause (location, typeface, heading), the parties' comparative bargaining power
and sophistication, the extent of actual bargaining, and whether the parties were
represented by lawyers in the contract negotiation. Despite the multi-factor analy-
sis, in most cases a sufficiently conspicuous jury waiver clause will be enforced
even in a contract of adhesion. 19
14. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848-49 (1986) (noting that
"personal constitutional rights that dictate the procedures by which civil and criminal matters must be
tried" are subject to waiver).
15. FED. R. Civ. P. 38(d). The same is often true in state courts. See, e.g., TEx. R. Civ. P. 216
(requiring jury demand and payment of jury fee).
16. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991) (Florida forum selection
clause on cruise line tickets); Nat'l Equip. Rental v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 316 (1964) (upholding a
contractual agreement to submit to the jurisdiction of a particular court). This is true despite the state
sovereignty component of personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. See Worldwide Volkswagen v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980) (citing "principles of interstate federalism embodied in the Consti-
tution").
17. Originally, the Supreme Court had rejected jury waiver clauses as unenforceable. Home Ins.
Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall) 445 (1874). Although the Supreme Court has not definitively ruled on
the issue, lower courts assume that such waivers are constitutional. See, e.g., Telum, Inc. v. E.F.
Hutton Credit Corp., 859 F.2d 835, 837 (10th Cir. 1988); Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Crane, 804 F.2d 828,
832 (4th Cir. 1986); Nat'l Equip. Rental v. Hendrix, 565 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that "it
is elementary that the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial is fundamental and that its protection
can only be relinquished knowingly and intentionally"). See generally Debra T. Landis, Annot., Con-
tractual Jury Waivers in Federal Civil Cases, 92 A.L.R. Fed. 688 (1989 & Supp. 2005). For a collec-
tion of state cases, see Jay M. Zitter, Annot., Contractual Jury Trial Waivers in State Civil Cases, 42
A.L.R.5th 53 (1996 and Supp. 2005). The only two states to reject pre-litigation jury waivers entirely
did so because of the language of state statutes rather than for general policy reasons. Their results
could therefore be changed by amending those statutes. See Grafton Partners v. Superior Court, 116
P.3d 679 (Cal. 2005); Bank South v. Howard, 444 S.E.2d 799 (Ga. 1994).
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., In re Prudential Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 124 (Tex. 2004); Westside-Marrero Jeep Eagle,
Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 56 F. Supp. 2d 694, 708 (E.D. La. 1999); Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v. Crane, 36
F. Supp. 2d 602, 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Chase Commercial Corp. v. Owen, 588 N.E.2d 705 (Mass.
App. 1992); Smyly v. Hyundai Motor Am., 762 F. Supp. 428 (D. Mass. 1991); Bonfield v. AAMCO
Transmissions, Inc., 717 F.Supp. 589 (N.D. Ill. 1989); David v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 298
N.Y.S 2d 909 (1969).
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C. Recent Cases
The jury waiver cases result from deference to party autonomy, as do recent
cases enforcing pre-dispute arbitration clauses. In both situations, the parties'
ability to agree to a forum and rules for dispute resolution is subject to very few
limits. In fact, some cases rely on the arbitration clause cases to undergird their
support of jury waivers.
One such case was decided recently in Texas. In re Prudential Insurance Co.
involved a restaurant lease.20 Prudential was the building lessor, and the tenants
21were Francesco Secchi, a native of Italy, and his wife Jane, a native of England.
Neither was educated beyond the eighth grade.22 The lease contained a paragraph
providing that "Tenant and Landlord both waive a trial by jury of any or all issues
arising in any action or proceeding between the parties hereto or their successors,
under or connected with this Lease, or any of its provisions."
2 3
The Secchis argued that jury waivers are contrary to public policy, because
they give non-government actors "the power to alter the fundamental nature of the
civil justice system by private agreement."2 4 The Texas Supreme Court rejected
that argument, noting that precedent already allows parties to contract for the law
that will apply and the forum in which litigation will take place, and lets them
waive the due-process based requirements for personal jurisdiction.25 The court
was also persuaded to allow waiver of juries because courts enforce arbitration
clauses: "Public policy that permits parties to waive trial altogether surely does
not forbid waiver of trial by jury."26 In fact, the court argued that the availability
of arbitration clauses makes it even more important to enforce jury waivers:
[I]f parties are willing to agree to a non-jury trial, we think it preferable
to enforce that agreement rather than leave thcm with arbitration as their
only enforceable option. By agreeing to arbitration, parties waive not
only their right to trial by jury but their right to appeal, whereas by agree-
ing to waive only the former right, they take advantage of the reduced
expense and delay of a bench trial, avoid the expense of arbitration, and
retain their right to appeal. The parties obtain dispute resolution of their
own choosing in a manner already afforded to litigants in their courts.
Their rights, and the orderly development of the law, are further pro-
20. 148 S.W.3d 124 (Tex. 2004). See also In re Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota N.A., 115 S.W.3d 600
(Tex. App. 2003) (finding contractual waiver of jury trial right enforceable since arbitration agree-
ments would be enforceable under the same circumstances).
21. Id. at 127.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 127-28.
24. Id. at 131.
25. Id.
26. Id. The Court did not note that while enforcement of arbitration clauses is mandated by preemp-
tive federal law, enforcement of jury waivers is not. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000)
(hereinafter "FAA"); Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 689 (1996) (holding that the
FAA preempts a state law requiring that contracts containing arbitration clauses provide notice of the
clause on the first page of the contract). While this should be a major difference between contracting
for arbitration and contracting for trial waivers, courts enforcing jury trial waivers do not tend to re-
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tected by appeal. And even if the option appeals only to a few, some of
the tide away from the civil justice system to alternate dispute resolution
is stemmed.
The court also addressed the issue of whether this particular jury waiver
clause was sufficiently voluntary.28 Its analysis demonstrated significant willing-
ness to enforce the contractual terms despite disparities in power and comprehen-
sion, resembling the courts' analyses in the arbitration clauses cases.29 The Sec-
chis argued that the jury waiver should not be enforced because: 1) the waiver
was in the fifty-third paragraph of a sixty-seven paragraph document, seven pages
before the signature page; 2) the waiver heading was misleading, since it was
called "Jury Trial" rather than "Jury Waiver"; 3) Prudential is a corporation with
billions of dollars in assets while the Secchis were immigrants with limited educa-
tions; and 4) the Secchis did not read the jury waiver or bargain for it.30 The
Texas Supreme Court, while not questioning these contentions, rejected the argu-
ment. The court noted that the Secchis had negotiated commercial leases before,
that Jane went over this lease with a lawyer, and that they did negotiate some
changes in the lease. 31 Based on these facts, the court found that the waiver was
knowing and voluntary as a matter of law.
32
A 1998 Connecticut case also used arbitration precedent to make waiving a
jury trial easier. In L & R Realty v. Connecticut National Bank,33 a group of real
estate developers sued a bank in connection with a dispute arising out of a loan to
develop a commercial property. 34 The loan documents contained jury waivers,
and the individuals who had guaranteed the loans challenged the enforcement of
the waivers. 35 In discussing the proper procedure to be used to decide jury waiver
issues, the court relied on arbitration law:
We begin by noting that jury trial waivers entered into in advance of liti-
gation are similar to arbitration agreements in that both involve the relin-
quishment of the right to have a jury decide the facts of the case .... Ar-
bitration is favored because it is intended to avoid the formalities, delay,
expense and vexation of ordinary litigation. . . . Arbitration agreements
illustrate the strong public policy favoring freedom of contract and the ef-
27. In re Prudential Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d. at 132.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 134.
30. Id. at 133-34.
31. Id. at 134.
32. Id. at 133-34. The court also pointed out that the clause was not printed in small type and that
the caption ("Counterclaim and Jury Trial") was in bold type. In re Prudential Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d at
134. Whether or not the Secchis had read the clause was immaterial: "Although the Secchis did not
read the paragraph, they are charged with knowledge of all of the lease provisions absent some claim
that they were tricked into agreeing to them." Id.
33. 715 A.2d 748, 753 (Conn. 1998).
34. Id. at 750.
35. Id. The loan agreement contained the following language, printed in boldface on the signature
page: "Waiver of trial by jury: Borrowers and Other Obligors irrevocably waive all right to a trial by
jury in any proceeding hereafter instituted by or against the Borrower or Other Obligors in respect of
this note or collateral which may secure this note." Id. at 750 n.2.
No. 11
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ficient resolution of disputes. These policies are also furthered by a jury
trial waiver clause.
36
Because of this policy, the court decided to treat contractual jury trial waivers
as "presumptively enforceable," and to enforce the waivers without the strong
showing of intent that would be required in a criminal case. 37 Instead, a civil con-
tractual jury waiver provision is "prima facie evidence that the party bound
thereby intentionally has waived its constitutional right to a trial by jury." 38 In
order to rebut the presumption of validity, a party seeking a jury trial despite the
clause must "come forward with evidence that it clearly did not intend to waive
the right to a jury trial. 3 9 The Connecticut court bolstered its pro-waiver position
by noting that most courts reject contractual jury waivers only in cases involving
"extreme bargaining disadvantage" or "gross inequality in the bargaining position
of the parties."
4
D. The Theoretical Underpinnings of Jury Waiver
1. Contract Theory
The assumption underlying courts' willingness to allow parties to customize
trials is simple: lawsuits are just private disputes. From this assumption flows the
turn to contract law.41 Thus, as Professor Resnik documents, the values dominat-
ing procedural discourse have shifted from process to contract: "A good deal of
contemporary doctrine on Contract Procedure assumes the wholesale application
of extant principles of contract law.",4 2 Contract theory, in turn, is based in part on
the free market concept that a person is legally bound by the bargains he has
made.43 The courts that enforce contracts as written because they were signed by
adults reflect this part of contract theory-a deal is a deal.
The last thirty years have seen contract doctrine return to a formalist ap-
proach, sometimes called the "new conceptualism."
36. ld. at 753.
37. Id. at 755.
38. L & R Realty, 715 A.2d at 752. For an argument that the burden should be placed on the party
seeking to enforce the wiaver, see Chester S. Chuang, Assigning the Burden of Proof in Contractual
Jury Waiver Challenges: When can an Employer Take away an Employee's Right to a Jury Trial?,
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=885579 (last visited Feb. 17, 2006).
39. Id. at 755. Absent such a showing, the court need not hold a hearing in determining whether the
jury waiver clause is enforceable. Id. at 756. If the party opposing the clause comes forward with
evidence of clear lack of intent, the court should hold a hearing at which "the party seeking to avoid
the waiver carries the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, the lack of a clear intent
to be bound by the waiver provision." Id. at 755-56.
40. Id. at 754 n.10. For a federal case relying on the analogy to arbitration clauses, see Smith-
Johnson Motor Corp. v. Hoffman Motors Corp., 411 F. Supp. 670, 675-76 (E.D. Va. 1975).
41. Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 597 (2005) [hereinafter
Resnik, Procedure]. See also Robert G. Bone, Agreeing to Fair Process: The Problem with Contrac-
tarian Theories of Procedural Fairness, 83 B.U. L. REV. 485, 490-91 (2003) (examining the theory
that procedure is fair if all parties would have agreed to the procedure had they been able to contract
prior to their dispute).
42. Resnik, Procedure, supra note 41, at 599.
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[Courts] embraced with fervor all the earlier-disdained incidents of clas-
sical formalism-the duty to read, the "plain meaning" rule, a vigorous
parol evidence rule, a high tolerance for "puffing," etc.-with the effect,
intended or not, of reducing or eliminating any constraints on the activi-
ties of the drafters of form contracts." Further, in most areas, "courts are
willing to rely on individual consent even as they know that such consent
is given under conditions of profound inequality.
45
Small wonder, then, that the courts which enforce waivers of substantive
rights enforce waivers of procedural ones as well.
2. Arbitration Jurisprudence
Courts' use of arbitration cases to support jury waivers is both ironic and un-
surprising. It is unsurprising because both draw on the courts' characterization of
litigation as private and their application of contract theory to procedural issues.
46
The irony stems from a formative gap in the arbitration cases themselves. As
Professor Sternlight has pointed out persuasively, a contract that agrees to manda-
tory binding arbitration has also agreed to waive a jury trial, and should have been
unenforceable unless it satisfied the demanding standard of constitutional waivers:
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.47 However, most courts did not make the
connection between the two bodies of law, and upheld arbitration clauses "even
when they are not knowing, voluntary or intelligent. To be valid, most courts
state arbitration clauses need not be negotiable, actually negotiated, or conspicu-
ous. Nor is a substantial disparity of bargaining power ... usually sufficient to
void an arbitration clause.
' 48
Pre-dispute arbitration clauses, then, were treated as different from jury
waiver clauses and upheld on a lesser showing of voluntariness than that required
of a jury waiver. Having established the law on easy enforcement of arbitration
clauses, the courts are beginning to stand the issue on its head by asking them-
selves this question: since a party can waive the right to a court completely under
comparatively easy standards, should it not be just as easy to waive the right to a
jury? At least the jury waiver clause keeps the dispute in the court system. Since
by upholding mandatory arbitration we allow parties to waive the full spectrum of
court procedures indirectly, courts are beginning to conclude that those procedures
44. Charles Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract Law, 71 FORDHAM
L. REv. 761, 774 (2002). See also Ralph James Mooney, The New Conceptualism in Contract Law, 74
OR. L. REv. 1131, 1206-07 (1995) (arguing that courts began to turn away from a more egalitarian
view of contract doctrine in the 1980s and early 1990s); JAY M. FEINMAN, UN-MAKING LAW 78-172
(2004) (contending that conservatives seek to radically limit the protections of common law contract).
45. Resnik, Procedure, supra note 41, at 662.
46. For an argument that jury waivers in the arbitration context should not have to be "knowing and
voluntary" see Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Clauses, Jury-Waiver Clauses and Other Contractual
Wiavers of Constitutional Rights, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167 (2004).
47. Jean R. Stemlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh Amendment
Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 669, 716-17 (2001) (arguing that arbitration
clauses should only be enforceable if they meet the same requirements as jury waivers).
48. Id. at 674 (chart showing differences between jury waiver and arbitration jurisprudence).
No. 1]
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can also be waived directly-if the system can be bypassed, it can also be manipu-
lated.
3. Efficiency
The trend toward enforcing jury waiver clauses is unsurprising for an addi-
tional reason. Judges, during this same time period, have seen case filings in-
crease while the supply of judges failed to expand at the same rate.49 As the back-
log of cases and the time between filing and trial grew, the judges adopted various
methods to encourage more and earlier settlement of cases. In this environment,
devices that save judges time have significant appeal. Arbitration clauses, which
remove cases from the system entirely, were therefore attractive from the courts'
own institutional perspective. Contractual terms that speed disposition by limiting
process should be similarly appealing. Elimination of the need to try a case by
jury could be seen as a time saving device. The jury waiver cases reflect this be-
lief, hailing the "reduced expense and delay" of the bench trial.50
4. Choosing Existing Processes
Finally, courts find jury waiver clauses acceptable because, although they do
involve private control over court procedure, it is a kind of private control that
already exists within the judicial system. The clauses are not asking the judges to
rule by reading entrails, throwing darts, or flipping coins. Nor are they requesting
three-judge panels or some kind of administrative process. Instead, the parties are
making the kind of choice they could make after a case is filed; they are simply
making it ahead of time. Just as a party could agree to arbitrate a dispute after it
has arisen, the arbitration cases allowed that choice to be made before a dispute
arose. Just as a party could forgo the right to a jury by failing to request one at
trial, the jury waiver cases allow that choice to be made in a pre-dispute contract. 51
E. From Commercial Entities to Employees and Consumers
The early cases concerning the enforcement of pre-dispute mandatory binding
arbitration clauses involved commercial parties and commercial deals. The first
case in which the Supreme Court announced its preference for arbitration was a
49. Shari Seidman Diamond & Jessica Bina, Puzzles About Supply-Side Explanations for Vanishing
Trials: A New Look at Fundamentals, 1 J. EMPIRICAL. LEGAL STUD. 637 (2004); Judith Resnik, Mi-
grating, Morphing, and Vanishing: The Empirical and Normative Puzzles of Declining Trial Rates in
Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL. LEGAL STUD. 783, 808 (2004) [hereinafter Resnik, Morphing] ("Between the
1960s and the 1990s, caseloads within the federal system tripled, as hundreds of new statutory causes
of action were enacted").
50. In re Prudential Ins. Co, 148 S.W.3d at 132. In addition, the perceived time savings is not offset
by policy qualms. Indeed, the jury waivers provide judges as decision makers, enabling parties to
choose a professional judiciary rather than the lay jury as the finder of fact. "Although trial judges
overwhelmingly profess admiration for juries, many in the judiciary are attracted by the prospect of
making their realm more rationalized and systematic by eliminating or at least taming the element of
lay spontaneity." Galanter, 2006 J. Disp. RESOL. 7.
51. Note that even when parties have waived a jury trial by default, the court can order one on its
own motion. FED. R. Civ. P. 39(b).
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dispute between a contractor and a hospital. 52  The case that applied the Federal
Arbitration Act to the states involved a dispute between a franchisor and franchi-
see.53 The case that began the rejection of public policy challenges to arbitration
was an antitrust claim involving an international business transaction.54  Once
courts got into the habit of accepting the clauses, the acceptance trickled down
into cases involving contracts between parties such as institutions and consumers,
and employers and employees. 5 Enforcement of arbitration clauses has also ex-
panded into tort claims arising out of contractual relationships.
56
So far, most of the cases enforcing contractual jury waivers involve commer-
cial contracts. Even where there is disparity of bargaining power, the weaker
party is still a businessperson negotiating a business deal of some kind, and the
disparity does not invalidate the waiver. For example, jury waiver clauses were
enforced in cases involving a lease of photocopier equipment,57 commercial real
estate leases, 58 and commercial loans. 59 The most established line of cases,
though, grow out of clauses in New York leases. In that context, they have come
to be enforceable in residential leases, even when the lessees are individuals., It
would not be surprising if the jury waiver doctrine followed the same path as the
arbitration cases, inexorably expanding contract enforcement into non-commercial
contracts of adhesion.
52. Moses H. Cone Mem'1 Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983).
53. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1984).
54. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985).
55. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 82-83 (2000) (arbitrating consumer lending
contract for mobile home purchase); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23-27
(1991) (requiring brokerage employee to arbitrate age discrimination claim). See generally David S.
Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in
an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 33.
56. See, e.g., Fleetwood Enters., Inc. v. Gaskamp, 280 F.3d 1069, 1074-78 (5th Cir. 2002) (health
problems caused by motor home); KFC Nat'l Mgm't Co. v. Beauregard, 739 So. 2d 630, 631 (Fla.
App. 1999) (assault by a co-employee); Parsley v. Terminix, No. C-3-97-394, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22891, *17-21 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 15, 1998) (health problems caused by exterminator's chemicals);
Burton v. Mt. Helix Gen'l Hosp., No. 14210 1976 Cal. App. LEXIS 1280, *11-12 (Cal. App. 1976)
(opinion originally published at 127 Cal. Rptr. 791, but ordered withdrawn from publication by Cali-
fornia Supreme Court on April 12, 1976) (medical malpractice). See generally Elizabeth Thomburg,
Contracting with Tortfeasors, 67 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 253 (2004).
57. Great America Leasing Corp. v. Cozzi Iron & Metal, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 875, 880-81 (N.D. Ill.
1999). See also Leasing Svc. Corp. v. Crane, 804 F.2d 828 (4th Cir. 1986) (equipment lease).
58. Amalgamated Trust & Savings Bank v. United Artists Eastern Theatres, Inc., No. 79 C 5153,
1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14457, *5-6 (N.D. IIl. Oct. 29, 1980); Mall, Inc. v. Robbins, 412 So. 2d 1197,
1199-1200 (Ala. 1982); In re Prudential Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d at 130-31.
59. Oei v. Citibank, N.A., 957 F. Supp. 492, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Cooperative Fin. Ass'n v. Garst,
871 F. Supp. 1168, 1172-73 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (loan to two partners in ranching business); Chase
Commercial Corp. v. Owen, 588 N.E.2d 705, 709 (Mass. App. 1992); In re Reggie Packing Co., 671 F.
Supp. 571, 593 (N.D. M. 1987) (loan to individual owning meat distribution business).
60. See, e.g., Pierre v. Williams, 431 N.Y.S.2d 249, 250 (City Civ. Ct. 1980); Dunbar Assoc. v.
Mulzac, 403 N.Y.S.2d 846, 847 (City Civ. Ct. 1978). New York does, however, make such waivers
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II. EXPANDING THE DESIGN: CHOOSING OTHER PROCEDURAL LIMITS
Given the contractual power to design a congenial trial process, what would
powerful parties desire? One way to gauge their wish list would be to examine
the reasons that they are said to choose arbitration clauses: to choose law that
minimizes their liability, to eliminate class actions, to eliminate the jury, to avoid
publicity,6' and to save time and money without sacrificing procedural advantage.
Arbitration also avoids collateral estoppel and the creation of unwanted precedent.
This section examines the kinds of contractual clauses that might help to achieve
these objectives while leaving litigation in the publicly-financed court system. It
considers both the kinds of options parties have been permitted to achieve by con-
sent, and the kinds of rights that parties may waive by failure to claim them.
6
Z
It is clear that some of this is achievable under existing laws. In the federal
courts and in many state courts, choice of forum clauses are enforceable absent
evidence of significant overreaching. 63 Choice of law clauses are also enforced
unless they offend a significant public policy of the state whose law would have
applied absent the clause.64 As the preceding section discussed, courts are also
increasingly enforcing jury waiver clauses. This has already gone a long way
toward achieving a friendly forum and the law that is most advantageous to the
contract drafter. How else might court processes be customized?
In order to focus on the terms most likely to be approved, the discussion be-
low will try to avoid those that create a probability of being rejected as uncon-
scionable. Therefore, covenants will be mutual since one-way arbitration provi-
sions are sometimes voided.65 Similarly, this section does not discuss one-way
66 67privilege waivers,66 waivers of the right to counsel, or changes in the burden of
61. See, e.g., National Arbitration Forum, Arbitration FAQ, at http://www.arbitration-truth.com
/arbitration-faq.htm#2 (last visited Mar. 5, 2006) ("Why use arbitration over litigation? .... Arbitra-
tion results are only made public with the consent of the parties involved in the dispute. This differs
from traditional court litigation in that courts are public forums and information about business and
personal affairs may become public knowledge.").
62. Once litigation has begun, the Federal Rules provides numerous occasions on which the parties
can choose procedures by agreement. See FED. R. CIv. P. 4 (service of process); 5 (service of plead-
ings and other papers); 15 (consent to amendments); 26 (stipulations about disclosures and the timing
and sequence of discovery); 29 (stipulations regarding discovery); 30 (varying rules re depositions); 31
(depositions on written questions); 33 (number and timing of interrogatories); 34-36 (discovery tim-
ing); 39 (consent to bench trial after jury demand); 48 (stipulations re non-unanimous verdict or jury of
less than six); 53 (consent to master); 73 (consent to trial by magistrate judge).
63. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991).
64. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 187. That state must also have a materially
greater interest in the issue than the state chosen in the choice of law clause. Id.
65. See, e.g., Samek v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 793 N.E. 2d 62, 64-66 (111. Ct. App. 2003) (deter-
mining that a one-way arbitration clause permitting an insurer to seek trial de novo, given an award in
excess of $ 20,000, violates public policy and effectively becomes substantively unconscionable);
Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 689-99 (Cal. 2000) (holding that it is
unconscionable to permit an employer to select either litigation or arbitration in the event of a dispute
while an employee's only option was arbitration); Pindeo v. Premium Tobacco Stores, Inc., 102 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 435, 439-40 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). But see Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173,
183-84 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding an arbitration clause not unconscionable for giving a drafting lender
unilateral control of whether a dispute is arbitrated or litigated).
66. But see Adreveno v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 34 Fed. 870, 871 (E.D. Mo. 1988)
(waiver of physician-patient privilege in insurance policy).
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proof. Nor does it consider rules not currently available in the courts, such as a
contract-based change to the 1983 version of Rule 11.68 Instead, this section will
examine in detail two provisions that would make trials more like arbitration:
class action prohibitions and confidentiality agreements. It will then briefly con-
sider other provisions that a contract drafter might want to include.
A. Class Action Waivers
1. Contract Theory and the Arbitration Analogy
Some businesses require arbitration of consumer disputes primarily to pro-
hibit class actions. 69 It should be similarly appealing if the class waiver were
available even without arbitration. Most courts have upheld contractual prohibi-
tions on class actions in the arbitration context. 70 The issue is often one of state
contract law: are such waivers unconscionable? While a few courts have rejected
67. Note, however, that there is normally no constitutional right to counsel in civil cases. See gener-
ally Elizabeth Thomburg, The Story of Lassiter: The Importance of Counsel in an Adversary System,
in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 489-527 (Kevin Clermont ed., 2004).
68. Such a clause could, for example, change the definition of good faith, eliminate the safe harbor
provision, make sanctions mandatory, and direct the payment of sanctions to the offended party.
69. Ron N. Dreben & Johanna L. Werbach, Top 10 Things to Consider in Developing an Electronic
Commerce Web Site, 16(5) COMPUTER LAW. 17, 19 (1999) ("Companies should consider including
dispute resolution clauses requiring arbitration, which may in some instances, serve as a defense to the
certification of a class action against the site owner."). See also Mark E. Budnitz, Arbitration of Dis-
putes Between Consumers and Financial Institutions: A Serious Threat to Consumer Protection, 10
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 267, 268 (1995) ("Arbitration programs [imposed by financial institu-
tions] were initially intended to avoid class action lender liability suits demanding punitive damages.").
70. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, remanding the
case for the arbitrator to decide whether class arbitration was prohibited by the contract, does not
explicitly reach the issue of whether a contract may prohibit arbitration, but the reasoning of both
majority and dissent treat the issue as one of contract construction. 539 U.S. 444 (2003). At least
eight states have held class action waivers to be enforceable in the arbitration context. See Walther v.
Sovereign Bank, 872 A.2d 735, 749-751 (Md. 2005); Strand v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n ND, 693 N.W.2d
918, 924-27 (N.D. 2005); Tsadilas v. Providian Nat'l Bank, 786 N.Y.S.2d 478, 480 (N.Y.App.Div.
2004); AutoNation USA Corp. v. Leroy, 105 S.W.3d 190, 200-01 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003); Rains v.
Found. Health Sys. Life & Health, 23 P.3d 1249, 1253-54 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001); Pybum v. Bill Heard
Chevrolet, 63 S.W.3d 351, 363-365 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2001); Gras v. Assocs. First Capital Corp., 786
A.2d 886, 889-93 (N.J. 2001); Brown v. KFC Nat'l Mgmt. Co., 921 P.2d 146, 166 n.23 (Hawaii 1996).
Six federal courts of appeals have reached similar results. See Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular
Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 174-75 (5th Cir. 2004); Livingston v. Associates Finance, Inc., 339 F.3d
553, 558-59 (7th Cir. 2003); Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc., 303 F.3d 496, 502-03 (4th Cir. 2002);
L.L.C. v. Emerson, 248 F.3d 720, 728-29 (8th Cir. 2001); Dominium Austin Partners v. First Family
Fin. Servs., Inc., 233 F.3d 1331, 1337-39 (1 1th Cir. 2000); Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d
366, 371-79 (3d Cir. 2000).
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waivers of class arbitration,71 in most states an arbitration clause that prohibits
class actions is enforceable under local law.
72
Even in states that find class action waivers to be unconscionable, careful
contract drafting may nevertheless make the clauses enforceable. By using a
choice of law clause and choosing the law of a state that allows waivers, the con-
tract drafter can dramatically increase the chances of contract enforcement. For
example, in Discover Bank v. Superior Court, a California resident obtained a
credit card from Discover Bank, which is domiciled in Delaware.73 The card-
holder agreement contained a choice of law clause choosing Delaware and federal
law.74 Under Delaware law, class action waivers are enforceable; under California
law, they are not. The court determined that the choice of law clause was en-
forceable, and so Delaware law applied to require individual arbitration of the
plaintiff's claim, rather than the nationwide class that he had sought.75
Would class action waivers be enforced in court proceedings pursuant to a
pre-litigation contract? Those states that find waivers enforceable in the arbitra-
tion context are likely to approve it in the courts. The arbitration cases have al-
ready determined that class action waivers are not unconscionable under those
states' contract law. The courts will explain that they are simply enforcing the
76parties' agreement. Those states that find such clauses unconscionable in the
arbitration setting will likely reach similar conclusions regarding class action
waivers for court proceedings - their decisions turn on the importance of the class
action as a remedy, and this remains true for court actions. Here again, though, a
choice of law clause could encourage the application of a pro-waiver law. This
would be even easier if the choice of law clause is coupled with a choice of forum
clause, choosing a forum that would enforce the choice of law clause.
2. Choosing Existing Processes
Like juries, class actions can be waived during litigation by default; simply by
not filing a case as a class action, the plaintiff waives a right to represent a class as
71. See Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1151 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying California law). Class action
waivers have been held unconscionable and unenforceable under the law of four states. See also
Whitney v. Alltell Commc'ns, Inc., 173 S.W.3d 300, 311-14 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005); Eagle v. Fred Mar-
tin Motor Co., 809 N.E.2d 116, 1180-83 (Ohio 2004); West Virginia ex rel Dunlap v. Berger, 567
S.E.2d 265, 278-79 (W.Va. 2002). See generally Jean R. Stemlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitra-
tion Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV., 125-26 (2000).
72. See Jack Wilson, "No-Class-Action Arbitration Clauses, " State-Law Unconscionability, and the
Federal Arbitration Act: A Case for Federal Judicial Restraint and Congressional Action, 23
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 737 (2004).
73. 134 Cal. App. 4th 886, 890 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005)
74. Id.
75. Id at 890-98. See also Discover Bank v. Super. Ct., 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 76, 95-96 (Cal. 2005)
(holding the clause unconscionable under California law, reversing the earlier court of appeals decision
in the case, and remanding to determine the impact of the choice of law clause). But see America
Online, Inc. v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 699, 708-13 (Cal. 2001) (voiding a choice of forum
clause that would have sent the case to Virginia, which in turn would have prohibited class treatment
and thus violated the public policy of California as expressed in the Consumers Legal Remedies Act).
76. To the extent that certain classes are certified to protect absent class members, the waiver
agreement might have third-party effects that a court would find problematic. This could be true, for
example, of 'limited fund' class actions under Federal Rule 23(b)(1) and its state law counterparts.
The kind of consumer and employment cases considered here are unlikely to involve this type of class.
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surely as by failing to demand a jury she waives a jury trial. Proceeding as an
individual claimant is certainly one of the options available in the court system.
Thus, the reasoning that a party may do by contract what she could do later by
failing to assert procedural rights, would support a contractual class action waiver.
3. Efficiency
The courts might also view class waiver as efficient. Certainly within any
one case, it would be faster and easier to litigate the named parties' dispute with-
out having to undertake class discovery, hold a class certification hearing, choose
class counsel, send notice to the class, and generally manage the class action. On
the other hand, viewed systemically, it could be more costly to litigate numerous
individual claims than a single class action.77 Even in cases seeking class certifica-
tion, however, the courts have been mostly unsympathetic to arguments that na-
tionwide class actions based on state law are efficient. The trend began with
Judge Posner's opinion in Rhone-Poulenc,78 and the aversion to treating mass
claims as class actions has been followed in a number of circuits and state
courts. 79 Widespread concern about the manageability of class actions may pro-
vide further support to those courts who would like to see the class action waivers
enforced in the interests of the defendants who contracted for them.
8 0
B. Confidentiality
A dispute filed in court will never be as hidden from public view as a dispute
resolved in a completely private forum. Nevertheless, a great deal of confidenti-
77. In a situation where individual plaintiffs claims are quite small, however, the alternative to a
class action might be no action at all, and that would also reduce the courts' caseload. For an argument
regarding the economic efficiency of small claims class actions see William B. Rubenstein, Why En-
able Litigation?: A Positive Externalities Theory of the Small Claims Class Action, 74 U.M.K.C.L.
REV.- (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=890303 (2006) (last visited May 12,
2006).
78. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, 51 F.3d 1293, 1295-1303 (7th Cir. 1995).
79. See, e.g., Compaq Computer Corp. v. Lapray, 135 S.W.3d 657, 658 (Tex. 2004); Exparte Green
Tree Fin. Corp., 723 So.2d 6, 11 (Ala. 1998); Castano v. Amer. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 756-62 (5th
Cit. 1996); Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 635 (3d Cir. 1996); In re Am. Med. Sys.,
75 F.3d 1069, 1079-90 (6th Cir. 1996); Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1234-35 (9th
Cir. 1996). See generally Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total
Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REv. 373,429-30 (2005); Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The
Class Action Counterreformation, 57 STAN. L REv. 1475, 1519-20 (2005).
80. The recent Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), was intended to make it easier to
remove state-filed actions to federal court, where many believe that class actions are less likely to be
certified. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Abandoning the Federal Class Action Ship: Is There Smoother
Sailing for Class Actions in Gulf Waters?, 74 TUL. L. REv. 1709, 1715 (2000) ("The prevailing sense
among some practitioners is that in many venues in the Gulf States--most notoriously Louisiana,
Texas, and, until recently, Alabama-judges are more than willing to certify almost anything that
walks through the courtroom doors."). The Texas Supreme Court has since decided cases that make
class certification much more difficult. See, e.g., Compaq Computer Corp. v. Lapray, 135 S.W.3d 657
(Tex. 2004).
81. Even arbitration clauses cannot guarantee complete privacy, since if a party chooses to litigate
the enforceability of the clause, that case will be open to the public and may attract publicity or result
in a reported opinion. Nor does the arbitration clause itself prevent a person with a complaint from
approaching the media, although the chosen arbitration rules may prevent it.
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ality can be contracted for, even in the court setting. Certain aspects of the dispute
can be sealed completely by agreement, and those agreements are often blessed by
the court since they are opposed by no one.
1. Post-Dispute Confidentiality Agreements
a. Docket Sheets and Court Records
The existence of a lawsuit is likely to be public. The First Amendment and
common law support a qualified right of access to docket sheets and other court
records.82 "By inspecting materials like docket sheets, the public can discern the
prevalence of certain types of cases, the nature of the parties to particular kinds of
actions, information about the settlement rates in different areas of law, and the
types of materials that are likely to be sealed. 83 The presumption of openness can
be rebutted only if the party seeking secrecy shows that suppression "is essential
to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest." 84
Despite this official right of access, cases do get completely sealed. In Con-
necticut, for example, "what appeared to be thousands of cases" were sealed so
that court personnel were prohibited from allowing the public access to the files
or, in some cases, from acknowledging the existence of the cases at all. 85 In 1988,
the Washington Post reported that the federal district court for the District of Co-
lumbia had in its index of cases twelve lawsuits in which the parties were listed as
"Sealed v. Sealed," at least some of which were sealed when they were filed.86 In
a law review article, the Chief Judge for the District of South Carolina described
what would happen if a visitor asked to see the record in Civil Action No. 3:00-
3768.87 Rather than being given the documents in the case, they would see an
order that reads:
The entire record in this case, except for this order, including pleadings,
exhibits, hearings, transcripts and prior opinions, memoranda and orders
of this court will be sealed, and access to it by other persons other than
the parties to this case shall be had only upon further order of this court.
82. Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 93-94 (2d Cir. 2004). See also FED. R. Civ. P.
77(b).
83. Hartford Courant Co., 380 F.3d at 95-96.
84. Grove Fresh Distribs. v. Everfresh Juice Co., 24 F.3d 893, 897 (7th Cir. 1994).
85. Hartford Courant Co., 380 F.3d at 86 (quoting Eric Rich & Dave Altimari, Elite Enjoy "Secret
File" Lawsuits, THE HARTFORD CouRANT, Feb. 9, 2003, at Al ("Judges have selectively sealed di-
vorce, paternity and other cases involving fellow judges, celebrities and wealthy CEOs that, for most
people, would play out in full view of the public...")).
86. Elsa Walsh, Public Courts, Private Justice: Hundreds of Cases Shrouded in Secrecy, WASH.
POST, Oct. 24, 1988, at Al.
87. Joseph F. Anderson Jr., Hidden from the Public by Order of the Court: The Case Against Gov-
ernment-Enforced Secrecy, 55 S.C. L. REv. 711, 712 (2004). Judge Anderson also quotes an order
from a case in Aiken County, S.C., which was the only public information in the case: "If anyone
involved in this case, the attorneys, the parties, or their representatives should disclose the terms and
conditions of the resolution of this case, they will be in contempt of this court." Id.
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At least in some cases, then, there is no meaningful public access even to
the existence of the dispute. It seems likely that the sealing was often
done pursuant to agreement of the parties.
88
b. Unfiled Discovery Materials
Discovery materials, since they are not generally filed with the court, are even
easier to hide.89 The Supreme Court, in Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, held that
the First Amendment does not limit the power of courts to enter protective orders
to limit dissemination of discovery materials. 90 The Supreme Court stressed that
discovery is not historically open and it is not part of a civil trial. That ruling
paved the way for continued contractual secrecy in the discovery phase of litiga-
tion. Parties, generally at the beginning of discovery, ask for and receive "um-
brella" orders that permit producing parties to designate materials as confidential
without advance examination of the materials by the court.91 The Manual for
Complex Litigation (Second) recommends such agreements and orders, asserting
that they "greatly expedite the flow of discovery material while affording protec-
tion against unwarranted disclosures." 92 By making such an agreement, the par-
ties can keep discovery materials out of the public eye. 93 Only if the discovery
materials need to be filed with the court for use in a merits-based motion do the
parties risk having to reveal the information. 94 Even then, if they are genuinely
protected by a privilege or some other right of privacy, a showing of good cause
will allow them to be filed under seal.95
88. See also Tresa Baldas, Divorces Sealed as Business Priority Company Data, Privacy Drive
Trend, NAT'L L. J., Nov. 14, 2005 (noting that courts are now sealing records "for companies, treating
trade secrets, assets, stock values and executive salaries as valuable, sensitive information that needs
special protection").
89. FED. R. Civ. P. 5(d).
90. 467 U.S. 20, 37 (1984).
91. For example, one such agreement provided that should defendant designate documents as confi-
dential,
[c]ounsel for any party other than the defendant shall use all product and information produced
and disclosed by the defendant solely for the purposes of preparing for trial of this action. Under
no circumstances shall material covered by this Protective Order be disclosed to anyone other
than counsel in this action and experts retained by them. At the conclusion of the proceedings in
this action, all documents and information subject to this Order, including any copies or extracts
or summaries thereof, or documents containing information taken therefrom, shall be returned to
counsel for the defendant.
Littlejohn v. BIC Corp., 851 F.2d 673, 676 (3d Cir. 1988).
92. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (SECOND) § 21.431 (1985). For academic arguments sup-
porting secrecy for discovery materials under most circumstances, see Richard L. Marcus, The Discov-
ery Confidentiality Controversy, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 457, 504-05; Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality,
Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 427, 501-02 (1991). For
arguments to the contrary, see Anderson, supra note 86; David S. Sanson, The Pervasive Problem of
Court-Sanctioned Secrecy and the Exigency of National Reform, 53 DUKE L.J. 807 (2003); Richard A.
Zitrin, The Case Against Secret Settlements (Or, What You Don't Know Can Hurt You), 2 J. INST. FOR
THE STUDY OF LEGAL ETHICS 115 (1999); Laurie Kratky Dore, Secrecy By Consent: The Use and
Limits of Confidentiality in the Pursuit of Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283 (1999).
93. But see TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. § 76a (making unfiled discovery materials public when they relate
to public health or safety or government wrongdoing). Texas practitioners, however, have informed
me that sealing orders are nevertheless routinely granted.
94. See, e.g., Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006).
95. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
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c. Trials and Trial Evidence
If there is an actual (unvanished) trial of the case, that trial probably needs to
be open to the public. Both common law and the First Amendment provide a
presumptive right of access to civil proceedings, including the live trial, exhibits
admitted into evidence, and transcripts of the trial.96 This right of access can be
rebutted, but only on a showing of "an overriding interest based on findings that
closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that
interest.,97 Even documents protected by an umbrella discovery order become
open to the public if they are introduced into evidence at trial98 or filed in support
of a successful motion for summary judgment.99
d. Settlements and Sealing Orders
When settlement enters the picture, sealing of the record becomes a distinct
possibility. The parties can shield the settlement itself from the public simply by
failing to file it with the court. In addition, settlement may be used to leverage
considerably greater confidentiality. Although the court should make particular-
ized findings to justify sealing the record, Judge Anderson describes the dynamics
that frequently occur in these cases. Attorneys for all of the parties in a trial ex-
pected to be lengthy advise the judge that they have settled the case, but that the
settlement is conditioned on a protective order that
provides for:
" Total confidentiality on the terms of settlement, to be enforced
by the court's contempt power;
" A return by the plaintiff of all documents produced during dis-
covery;100
" A prohibition on plaintiff's counsel and plaintiff discussing the
case; and
" The vacating of substantive orders entered in the case, thereby
removing this precedent from the record."'' 1
As Judge Anderson points out, if the judge signs this order, all of the parties
will be happy. 'The plaintiff recovers a handsome sum, both lawyers get paid, the
defendant gets its court-ordered secrecy, the judge has one less case to try, and
96. In re Cendant Corp., 260 F.3d 183, 192 (3d Cir. 2001). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 43 (taking of
testimony to be in open court).
97. Publicker Indus., v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1073 (3d Cir. 1984).
98. Littlejohn, 851 F.2d at 680.
99. Republic of Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 949 F.2d 653 (3d Cir. 1991); Rushford v.
New Yorker Magazine, 846 F.2d 249 (4th Cir. 1988); Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982).
100. When exhibits are returned to the parties in a settled case, at some point they cease to be "court
records" and the public loses access to them. See Littlejohn, 851 F.2d at 683 ("We... hold that, ab-
sent allegations of fraud or other extraordinary circumstances, trial exhibits that were restored to their
owner after a case has been completely terminated and which were properly subject to destruction by
the clerk of court are no longer judicial records within the 'supervisory power' of the district court.").
101. Anderson, supra note 87, at 728.
[Vol. 2006
18
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2006, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 14
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2006/iss1/14
Designer Trials
there is no one around to object to the secrecy order.' 1° 2 Therefore there is sig-
nificant pressure to agree to enter the requested sealing order. 0 3 Once the order
has been entered, it can only be changed on a showing of "some extraordinary
circumstance or compelling need," especially if the order was granted in the con-
text of a settlement.'°4
2. Pre-Litigation Contracts
Once a dispute has arisen, contractual agreements permit parties to secure
significant, but not complete, privacy. Doctrinally, the public court system comes
with a presumption of public access. Functionally, however, private agreements
are often enforced absent media interest in the case forcing the courts to apply the
First Amendment and common law rules of openness. It is quite easy for the par-
ties to provide for the secrecy of unfiled discovery materials. Would the courts
also enforce pre-litigation contracts for secrecy?
a. Contract Theory and the Arbitration Analogy
A philosophy of deferring to the parties' contract could lead the courts to en-
force pre-litigation contracts for privacy. They are no less bargained-for than jury
waiver clauses, and courts have allowed the contracting away of constitutional
rights. In the context of sealing orders, though, the parties attempt to contract
around the rights of non-parties. This may not be an insurmountable problem,
because there is precedent for enforcing contracts with public effects by focusing
instead on its significance to the parties. Jury waivers, for example, allow the
parties to bargain away the public's right to participate in self-government through
serving on juries, just as secrecy agreements allow the parties to bargain away the
public's right to knowledge about the court system. Further, secrecy agreements
have been incorporated into court orders in pending litigation with only occasional
qualms. While certain secrecy provisions, as applied, might violate public policy,
it seems likely that many would be enforced.1
0 5
Analogies to arbitration cases would also support the contractual confidential-
ity clauses. One of the dominant reasons that parties contract for arbitration rather
than litigation is to avoid publicity. Although commentators sometimes bemoan
the resulting loss of information about disputes, secrecy in arbitration is well es-
102. Id. at 729.
103. See Marcus, supra note 92, at 502-05 (describing the forces that encourage such settlements and
arguing that, although there will be occasional public policy problems, such orders are generally ap-
propriate).
104. Geller v. Branic Int'l Realty Corp., 212 F.3d 734, 738 (2d Cir. 2000). See also Miller, supra
note 92, at 486-87 ("absent special circumstances, a court should honor confidentialities that are bar-
gained-for elements of settlement agreements"); U.S. v. Glens Falls Newspapers, Inc., 160 F.3d 853,
858 (2d Cir. 1998).
105. Discovery confidentiality orders are on safer ground, while settlements that seal the record will
sometimes be more problematic. "In extreme instances, a settlement agreement might be void as
against public policy if it is intended to suppress evidence. Such instances will be exceedingly rare,
however; if the agreement provided that all materials turned over through discovery be returned and
that all copies of these materials be destroyed the court might suspect such concerns are implicated."
Marcus, supra note 92, at 504.
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tablished. The arbitration analogy might work again: if you can get complete
secrecy by agreeing to arbitrate, why not encourage parties to stay in the court
system by allowing secrecy there as well? Given the constitutional and common
law limits on court secrecy, this might provide the public with more information
about disputes than the arbitration alternative.
b. Choosing Existing Processes
Protective orders and sealing orders are available in conventional litigation.
When no one objects, they are even more available than black letter law would
lead one to believe. A pre-dispute contract that mandates secrecy is arguably
changing only the timing of the agreement. Unlike jury waivers and class action
status, however, protective orders do not arise simply from party default. While
parties can effectively waive a jury trial and decline to represent a class on their
own, parts of the quest for confidentiality require the cooperation of the judge, and
in theory require a showing of at least good cause even in the post-dispute setting.
While judges can enforce clauses waiving juries by inaction (not summoning a
jury), a sealing order requires affirmative conduct from the judge. While some
judges are quite content to go along with the parties in the interest of facilitating
settlement, others sometimes balk at sealing the record. The need for court coop-
eration to invoke this device during litigation can pose challenges to the enforce-
ability of pre-dispute contracts. As with the other devices, though, confidentiality
provisions are available on the existing menu of court processes.
c. Efficiency
The efficiency argument for secret agreements is two-fold, and depends on
the stage of litigation to be kept secret. Umbrella confidentiality orders during the
discovery process can be efficient as they eliminate the need for time-consuming
discovery disputes and orders, saving time both for the parties and the court. The
agreements eliminate the need to file particularized motions for protective orders
(and accompanying briefs) for each document that a party believes is protected as
a trade secret or is otherwise confidential. They therefore eliminate the need for
the court to rule on such disputes until a document needs to be used for some mer-
its-based motion or introduced at trial. This may mean the judge never needs to
rule on the document's status at all. If the agreed order extends to producing
privileged documents, subject to a "claw back" for inadvertent production, the
document production process can move at an even faster pace as documents do
not have to be screened for privilege before they are produced. At the same time,
parties get to see their opponents' documents, because they are produced subject
to the confidentiality order. This may hasten the settlement process, making set-
tlements more closely "match" the merits of a case.
The other efficiency argument relates to sealing orders that are agreed to as a
term of an overall settlement. Proponents argue that many cases would not settle
absent sealing and that settlement is more efficient than trial.
Settlement not only reduces the need for further governmental involvement, it
also reduces the cost of dispute resolution to the litigants and helps conserve valu-
able judicial resources. This promotes the more efficient operation of the court
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system. "Our civil justice system could not bear the increased burden that would
accompany reducing the frequency of settlement or delaying the stage in the liti-
gation at which settlement is achieved." 1° 6
These efficiency claims may be somewhat overstated. For discovery, an um-
brella order can delay the day of reckoning, but disputes with regard to documents
that are central to the litigation will happen eventually, unless the case settles be-
fore that becomes necessary. For settlement, secrecy is not important to settle-
ment in all, or even most, cases. Would a party unable to obtain a sealing of the
entire file prefer a public trial to a quiet private settlement? The District of South
Carolina, for example, experienced no decrease in settlements (or in filings) after
it adopted a stringent anti-secrecy local rule. 10 7 In addition, where the sealing
order prohibits sharing information with other litigants with similar cases, it could
become inefficient in that it requires duplicative discovery and, in all likelihood,
duplicative discovery disputes.
C. Miscellaneous Additional Clauses
Rather than belabor the analysis, this section will list briefly other contract
terms that an institutional defendant might consider adding to its wish list. All are
provisions that can be chosen during the litigation process either by default or by
contract, and all have an arguable efficiency benefit to the court system.
1. No Appeal
Part of the attraction of arbitration is its trial-stage finality. Arbitral awards
can be reviewed only under the most limited circumstances, hastening the final
disposition of the dispute. 109 In addition to speed, lack of appeal limits the poten-
tial for unfavorable precedent that would apply to cases more generally. By con-
tracting to arbitrate, parties are essentially contracting out of the right to appeal.
Could an explicit provision waiving the right to appeal be made part of a pre-
dispute contract?'I1
Lack of appeal is certainly available by post-dispute default. Just as a jury
can be waived if a party fails to make a timely request, an appeal can be waived
106. Miller, supra note 92, at 486.
107. Anderson, supra note 87, at 726.
108. See Paul Carrington, Recent Efforts to Change Discovery Rules: Advice for Draftsmen of Rules
for State Courts, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 456, 468 (2000) (noting that "the diseconomies of redun-
dant discovery ought to be avoided if possible"). See also Marcus, supra note 92, at 496.
109. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000); Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 932 (10th Cir. 2001) (ex-
plaining standards for vacating an award).
110. Whether an institutional party would want to bargain for such a provision is another question.
Although prohibiting a losing plaintiff from appealing would help the institution, it might want to be
able to launch its own appeal. Recent research by Professors Eisenberg, Schwab, and Clermont indi-
cates that defendants in federal court have a significant advantage on appeal. See Kevin M. Clermont,
Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in the
Federal Courts of Appeals, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 547 (2003); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore
Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia in the Appellate Courts: Civil Rights Really Do Differ From Negotiable
Instruments, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 947 [hereinafter Clermont & Eisenberg, Plaintiphobial. It would
also present an interesting issue if the trial court refused to enforce parts of the parties' contractual
design. Could the unhappy drafter appeal or otherwise review that decision?
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by failure to comply with appellate deadlines."' Appeal is not generally the
norm. For litigated cases (disposed of through trial or dispositive motion), the
appeal rate is far less than half."12 Appeal can also be foregone by agreement.
Lack of appeal is a central feature of most settlements. Even defendants in crimi-
nal cases may agree to appeal waivers as part of the plea bargaining process." 13 In
Europe, parties can agree to "exclusion agreements" that effectively eliminate the
right to appeal."
14
An efficiency argument can also be made for eliminating appeals. The courts
of appeal themselves have a heavy case load and perceive their time as limited. In
addition, a reversal on appeal might lead to a remand for new trial, thus adding to
the work load of the trial courts. In certain types of disputes, the courts themselves
have advocated limiting the availability of appeal in the name of efficiency." 5
2. Limited Discovery
The cost of discovery is often cited by institutional defendants as a problem
with the court system and a reason for choosing arbitration. Discovery could be
limited by default. Discovery is, after all, party-initiated and parties can choose to
limit their discovery." 6 Discovery limits can also be chosen by contract. During
litigation, Rule 29 allows the parties by written stipulation to "modify ... proce-
dures governing or limitations placed upon discovery."'" 7 Further, Rule 26 re-
quires a discovery planning conference, and notes that the conference should in-
clude consideration of whether discovery should be limited to particular issues,
whether changes should be made in the limitations on discovery, and whether
other limitations should be imposed." 
8
111. See, e.g., FED. R. APP. P. 4.
112. Clermont & Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia, supra note 110, at 951, 967.
113. Nancy Jean King, Priceless Process: Nonnegotiable Features of Criminal Litigation, 47
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 113, 115, 147-48 (1999).
114. See Kenneth M. Curtin, An Examination of Contractual Expansion and Limitation of Judicial
Review of Arbitral Awards, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 337, 360-61 (2000) (arguing that parties
may contractually modify their appeal rights in arbitration to decrease but not to increase the scope of
review). The federal courts of appeal are split on the issue, with some favoring the contractual provi-
sions based on party autonomy and some rejecting contracts that expand appellate rights as threatening
the integrity of the arbitral process. Id. at 356-60.
115. Judith Resnik, Precluding Appeals, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 603, 605-06 (1985). They have also
been cutting back on judicial time spent on existing appeals and limiting precedent through nonpubli-
cation of opinions. See Lauren Robel, The Practice of Precedent: Anastasoff, Noncitation Rules, and
the Meaning of Precedent in an Interpretive Community, 35 IND. L. REV. 399 (2002); William M.
Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency and the New Certiorari: Requiem for the
Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273 (1996).
116. Empirical research has consistently found that in most cases the amount of discovery done is
quite modest. See James S. Kakalik, Discovery Management: Further Analysis of the Civil Justice
Reform Act Evaluation Data, 39 B.C. L. REV. 613, 621-22 (1998); Thomas E. Willging, An Empirical
Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L.
REv. 525, 540 (1998).
117. FED. R. CIv. P. 29.
118. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(0. See also FED. R. Ctv. P. 16(c)(6) (suggesting pretrial order regarding the
control and scheduling of discovery).
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Limits on discovery are an increasingly common feature of litigation. Many
systems' rules of procedure place numerical limits or time limits on discovery.
19
Limiting the quantity of discovery and the duration of discovery could also be
characterized as more efficient in the sense that it saves time within particular
lawsuits.
3. Modification of the Rules of Evidence
Many of the rules of evidence are designed for jury trials, and their intent is to
keep information from the jury that jurors might misinterpret or give too much
weight. Bench trials, on the other hand, relax the rules of evidence. A judge serv-
ing as trier of fact can admit improper evidence and, as long as she does not spe-
cifically rely on that evidence, will be presumed to have disregarded it. Since this
article assumes that the contract drafter will have provided for waiver of a jury,
the relaxation of evidentiary rules might also be something desired for efficiency's
sake. There might even be particular rules that a party would want to override.
At trial, a party can easily waive the impact of most rules of evidence simply
by failing to object. In fact, the timing of evidentiary objections (and hence the
timing of waiver) has been moved forward in many jurisdictions by pretrial rules
that require advance exchange of exhibits and objections. 120 A contractual clause
regarding evidence rules, either generally stating that the strict rules of evidence
will not apply, or modifying particular rules, would simply move the timing up
even further.'12
Wigmore's treatise on evidence bemoans the fact that "courts have not di-
rectly confronted the tension between the values of party autonomy and factfind-
ing reliability, ' ' 2 and what case law exists is evenly split. 123 While Wigmore
"was prepared, within broad limits, to accept agreements that might undermine the
accuracy of the fact-finding process merely because the parties had agreed to a
certain regimen of proof," Professor Tillers, the 1985 reviser, welcomed limits on
party autonomy based on "an old-fashioned belief that the forms of justice should
not be bartered and sold and since, in addition, we have grave doubts as to
119. See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 30(a)(2)(A); 30(d)(2) (limiting number and duration of depositions); 33
(limiting number of interrogatories); TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.1-5 (creating discovery levels that limit use of
devices and time for discovery).
120. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(3).
121. Such modification is apparently possible. See David H. Taylor & Sara M. Cliffe, Civil Proce-
dure by Contract: A Convoluted Influence of Private Contract and Public Procedure in Need of Con-
gressional Control, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 1085, 1086 n.5 (2002) (citing JOHN KOBAYASHI, Too Little,
Too Late: Use and Abuse of Innocuous Yet Dangerous Evidentiary Doctrines, in 2 ALI-ABA COURSE
OF STUDY: TRIAL EVIDENCE, CIVIL PRACTICE, AND EFFECTIVE LITIGATION TECHNIQUES IN FEDERAL
AND STATE COURTS 1127, 1141-45 (1991)); Note, Contracts to Alter the Rules of Evidence, 46 HARV.
L. REV. 138 (1932) (stating that "application of the 'arbitrary' rules of evidence to litigation involving
modem business has provoked widespread criticism"). To the extent that certain rules of evidence are
designed to protect the witnesses rather than the parties, modification of those rules might be beyond
the power of the contracting future litigants.
122. JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 563 n.2 (Peter Tillers rev.
1985).
123. See generally id. § 7a.
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whether almost any agreement concerning evidentiary matters entered into before
any dispute has arisen is likely to be substantively fair."'
' 24
4. Time Limits on the Presentation of Evidence
The amount of time that a party will take to present his case is largely under
the party's control. A time limit, therefore, can be accomplished through default.
In an actual trial, for example, a party gives up the right to present evidence for
two weeks by presenting it for only one week and resting its case. In arbitration,
the governing rules often place time limits on the presentation of evidence, 25 and
so by contracting to arbitrate, parties have contracted for time limits. Time limits
are also an existing part of the courts' current options. Judges are encouraged in
these managerial times to enter an order "establishing a reasonable limit on the
time allowed for presenting evidence."' 126 Such a degree of control, which also
includes the power to order a party to present evidence early in the trial on a po-
tentially dispositive issue, is intended to increase trial efficiency. The designer
trial would change only the timing of the decision, and put it in the hands of the
parties rather than the presiding judge. 127
D. Where Are We Headed?
A number of forces have changed and are changing the face of dispute resolu-
tion in the United States: the cost of formal proceedings, 128 distrust of the jury,
dislike for discovery, respect for party autonomy, appreciation of alternative de-
vices, and, for some, an antipathy for government regulation of any kind.129 So
far, most of the changes have moved disputes out of courts and into other venues:
mediation, arbitration, dispute centers, and administrative agencies. 3 ° Some
changes, however, have already begun to affect court behavior. The Vanishing
Trial data show that a larger percentage of cases are being decided on pre-trial
124. Id. at 562-63.
125. For example, under the rules of procedure of the National Arbitration Forum, even disputes
exceeding $30,000 are limited to 180 minutes unless additional fees are paid. Smaller cases get even
less time, with the smallest scheduled for only an hour altogether. National Arbitration Forum, Code
of Procedure, Rule 34(B), available at http://www.arb-forum.comlprogramscode-new/parts.asp (last
visited Mar. 5, 2006).
126. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(15).
127. See also Patrick E. Longan, The Shot Clock Comes to Trial: Time Limits for Federal Civil
Trials, 35 ARIz. L. REV. 663 (1993).
128. See Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to
Settlement, 44 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1, 62-63 (1996).
129. See generally Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Mat-
ters in Federal and State Courts, I J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 517-20 (2004); Rex R. Per-
schbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett, The End of Law, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1 (2004); John Lande, Failing Faith
in Litigation? A Survey of Business Lawyers' and Executives' Opinions, 3 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1
(1998); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation
Co-Opted, or "The Law of ADR," 19 FLA. ST. L. REV. 1 (1991); Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudi-
catory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 494 (1986); Friedman, supra note 8, at 703.
130. See Resnik, Morphing, supra note 49.
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motions. 31 Judges have been encouraged to emphasize speed and cost control,
and to view their job as disposing of cases rather than as applying the law. By
putting a premium on efficiency and autonomy, many judges decry a trial as a
failure and strive above all to move the parties toward settlement.' 32 "Courts have
embraced the privatization of public processes, the diminution of transparency,
and the decline of regulation.
'' 33
These same forces have motivated some of the recent changes in procedural
rules. For example, the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act's requirement that
federal district courts facilitate alternative dispute resolution, 34 the Private Securi-
ties Litigation Reform Act's limits on pleadings and discovery,' 35 the 1993
amendments to Rule 16 directing judges to promote alternative dispute resolu-
tion,' 36 the 2000 amendments to the discovery rules that cut back on automatic
initial disclosure and limited the scope of relevance' 37 the 2003 amendments to
the class action rule,38 and the Class Action Fairness Act 139 have all attempted to
reduce litigation costs and modify some of the aspects of procedure most disliked
by the business community. 40 For a while, the Advisory Committee explored the
possibility of "Simplified Rules" of procedure for trials seeking monetary dam-
ages of less than $50,000.' 4' Attempts to limit the scope of the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act, meanwhile, went nowhere, and companies continue to write contracts
requiring binding arbitration. 142
The next step could be a combination of arbitration's ability to customize
procedure and the courts' growing receptiveness to limits on process. This article
has mentioned only a few of the most obvious ways in which litigants might want
to design their own processes. Other designs could be drafted as well, and they
could be better tailored by a repeat player who can accurately predict what its
future disputes will look like. 143 If enforceable, such agreements could also be
designed on a post-dispute basis by litigants with more equal bargaining power.44
131. Gillian K. Hadfield, Where Have All the Trials Gone? Settlements, Nontrial Adjudications, and
Statistical Artifacts in the Changing Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
705 (2004).
132. Patrick Higginbotham, So Why Do We Still Call Them Trial Courts?, 55 SMU L. REV. 1405
(2002) (examining the declining use of trials); Resnik, Morphing, supra note 49, at 811.
133. Resnik, Morphing, supra note 49, at 824.
134. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (2000).
135. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1 (2000).
136. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(9).
137. FED. R. Ctv. P. 26(a) & (b).
138. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
139. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in 28 U.S.C.).
140. Judge Weinstein argues that the trend toward privatization of dispute resolution "must be put in
the context of a variety of recent procedural and substantive modifications designed to limit plaintiffs'
access to the courts." Jack B. Weinstein, Some Benefits and Risks of Privatization of Justice Through
ADR, II OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 241, 257 (1996).
141. Edward H. Cooper, Simplified Rules of Federal Procedure?, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1794, 1797
(2002).
142. Russell D. Feingold, Mandatory Arbitration: What Process is Due?, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 281,
292-98 (2002) (discussing unsuccessful legislative efforts to limit the use of arbitration clauses in
adhesion contracts).
143. For example, much of the law regarding pre-dispute agreements to alter the rules of evidence
arises out of insurance contracts which stipulate that certain types of proof were required to establish
the insured's right to recover. Courts were split on whether to enforce such agreements based on
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This article has looked at the contractual modifications one at a time, and
concluded that a number of them might be enforced based on the reasoning of the
arbitration and jury waiver cases. However, the hypothetical contract with which
the article began combined them, allowing the parties to make for themselves, in
advance, a number of decisions that taken together privatize the public system in
significant ways.145 Will the courts be as receptive to a package of contractual
decisions made for them by the parties?
I. THE LIMITS OF DESIGN
The implications of the Designer Trial are complex, because the public court
system serves both private and public functions. As Professor Landes and Profes-
sor Posner demonstrated years ago, courts have dual roles.146 One role is to pro-
vide a private service--dispute resolution. In serving this function, the courts
react to litigants who have requested their help by processing the claims and de-
fenses, assisting in settling the controversy, and making available a mechanism to
resolve the dispute and enforce the result if agreement is not forthcoming. 147 Un-
der this view, courts are serving the needs of private parties. As a result, they
should honor the autonomy of those parties in making decisions about the most
efficient, private method of reaching a quality solution. Settlements are also fa-
vored because they end disputes and "reestablish order more quickly and less
disruptively than adjudication.' 48
concepts of party autonomy, or to reject them based on public policy concerns. See WIGMORE, supra
note 121, §7a.
144. One could even imagine situations in which pre-dispute agreements could be made in the context
of criminal law. In India, for example, there is a system of "anticipatory bail" in which a person who
believes he or she will be arrested can go in advance to court and apply in advance for bail. See Know
Your Law: Anticipatory Bail, available at http://www.ourkarnataka.cormArticleslaw/anticipatory-
bail.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2006).
145. When I first began working on this article, I worried that I was being unduly paranoid about the
possibility of contract jurisprudence spilling over from arbitration to litigation. Just as this article was
going to print, however, a number of new pieces advocating contractual procedure modifications
appeared on the Social Science Research Network. See Michael L. Moffitt, Customized Litigation:
The Case for Making Civil Procedure Negotiable, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv.-(2007) (forthcoming),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=888221 (arguing for post-dispute bargaining) (last visited May
12, 2006); Henry S. Noyes, If You (Re)Build It They Will Come: Contracts to Remake the Rules of
Litigation in Arbitration's Image (Feb. 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=891301 (arguing in
favor of enforcing all contractual modifications not prohibited by Congress) (last visisted May 12,
2006); Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Principles of Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814
(2006), available at http://ssrn.comabstract=722263 (arguing for contractual modifications of burdens
and standards of proof) (last visited May 12, 2006).
146. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD.
235 (1979).
147. This view of litigation's "primary mission" as dispute resolution is reflected in the writings of
Professors Miller and Marcus on discovery secrecy. See Miller, supra note 92, at 431; Marcus, supra
note 92, at 468. See also Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REV. 353
(1978) (arguing that courts are best suited to resolve private disputes between private parties).
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The courts' second role is to produce public goods' 49 and serve public func-
tions.' 50 For example, courts create precedents and legal rules. The public proc-
esses of courts provide an opportunity for public debate about and the develop-
ment of social norms.1 5' The resulting legal regulation "enables economic forma-
tion and transactions, deters health and safety hazards, compensates injuries, [and]
protects basic civil rights."' 52  For this lawmaking purpose, the government-
created rules of procedure represent the rulemakers' assessment of the best way to
achieve reliable application of law to fact without unnecessary expense or delay.
In addition to legal rules, courts provide the public with information about court
processes,' 53 information about the nature of disputes and the facts underlying
those disputes, and information about dispute outcomes.'
54
In addition to functional public benefits, courts serve as important cultural
icons. "Trials are more than a forum for the objective adjudication of contested
facts.... They are rituals-one of the few in our secular, heterogenous society,
that are open to all."'55 This ritual legitimizes legal authority, 156 and "subsidizes a
judicial authority that is available for future litigants."', 57 It is important that our
court system is (or at least aspires to be) visibly egalitarian, providing opportuni-
ties for parties to express themselves, and treating them with respect.' 8 The gov-
ernment-created rules of procedure represent, in this symbolic sense, the system's
best efforts to find a correct balance between fairness and efficiency, and to pro-
149. "Economists define a public good as a beneficial product that cannot be provided to one con-
sumer without making it available to all (or at least many others). The textbook example is a light-
house: if one shipper erects a lighthouse, she cannot prevent other ships navigating the same waters
from using it for free." Id. at 2623.
150. Even the courts' private role has a public component. It is in society's interest that disputes be
peacefully resolved according to predictable rules of behavior, and so courts are publicly created and
funded.
151. Professor Fiss is probably the best known proponent of this public conception of the role of
courts. See Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93
HARv. L. REV. 1, 29 (1979) ("[Clourts exist to give meaning to our public values, not to resolve dis-
putes.").
152. John Lande, Shifting the Focus From the Myth of "The Vanishing Trial" to Complex Conflict
Management Systems, or I Learned Almost Everything I Need to Know About Conflict Resolution from
Marc Galanter, CARDOZO J. OF CONF. RES. (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 21, on file with au-
thors). When the government is a litigant, the case outcome itself may well have a direct impact on
members of the public. It is difficult to draw a clear line between disputes that are purely private and
those that are public. For example, modem product liability suits "are 'private' actions for damages,
but given the increasingly regulatory tinge of much modem tort law, they have implications for the
public." Marcus, supra note 92, at 469.
153. See Resnik, Procedure, supra note 41, at 623-24. Public scrutiny of the court system is an
important reason for the traditional presumption that court processes must be open. See Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
154. Luban, supra note 148, at 2625 ("mhe discovery and publicizing of facts, which may subse-
quently be used by political actors, ordinary citizens, or other agents in the legal system (litigants as
well as lawyers), is a public good created by adjudication"). This function of the court system is some-
times referred to as its educational role. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 8, at 689 ("[llnsofar as the
"trial" did exist, it served a function that the legal system no longer cares to fulfill, at least not in the
traditional way. This function was a didactic or theatrical or educational function.").
155. Paul Butler, The Case for Trials: Considering the Intangibles, I J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
627,629 (2004).
156. CHASE, supra note 9, at 119-22.
157. Luban, supra note 148, at 2625.
158. CHASE, supra note 9, at 52, 60, 119-22.
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vide facially equal opportunities for all litigants. Professor Ackerman also sug-
gests that the lack of public trials may decrease social capital and the communi-
tarian values of America.' 
59
The system's dual identities create conflicting norms for decisions about
whether courts should enforce contracts for customized litigation. If one views
the courts as merely resolving private disputes, there is a strong reason to allow
private parties to tweak the process. Their contract, seen as a private matter, em-
bodies the consent of every affected party. The primary issue for the court would
be assuring meaningful assent to the contract's terms. If one views the courts as
providing public goods, however, a contract between the litigants affects members
of the community, and "the public" has not signed off on the contract either di-
rectly or by voting for its drafters.
It is not possible to decide enforcement by categorizing particular procedural
components as "private" (easy to contract for) or "public" (requiring greater scru-
tiny), because most features of civil procedure exist for both reasons. Most pro-
cedural rules function both to resolve a particular dispute for the private litigants
and to assure accurate enforcement of legal rules for public regulatory reasons. In
doing so, courts try to strike an adversarial balance between the parties. For ex-
ample, pleadings rules serve the parties by requiring fair notice of claims and de-
fenses, and they serve the public by establishing the threshold for using the state's
powers to assert a claim. Discovery rules serve the parties by providing informa-
tion needed for trial and by governing party costs. They serve the public by mak-
ing information available for more accurate outcomes and limiting the cost of the
judicial system. Joinder rules serve the parties by allowing efficient use of the
litigants' resources and serve the public by allowing efficient use of the courts'
resources. Juries serve the parties by resolving contested issues of fact necessary
to decide the dispute, and they serve the public by injecting democratic citizen
participation into the formulation and application of the law. Appeals serve the
parties by correcting errors in the particular case and the public by providing
precedent to govern future behavior and future lawsuits. The transparency of all
of these processes serves the educational and symbolic values discussed above.
Enforcement of a contract that makes a package of procedural choices would
also work dramatic changes in the role of the trial judge. Under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and their state counterparts, judges have an enormous amount
of discretion. "With their flexible, equity-based approach aimed at diminishing
formalism, these rules put trial judges front and center and endowed them with a
good deal of discretion to tailor processes to the circumstances of a particular
case."' 16 During the pre-trial phase, judges have considerable discretion in man-
aging the lawsuit, in shaping the scope of claims and parties, in allowing amend-
ments to the pleadings, in making decisions about discovery relevance and bur-
den, in ordering ADR, and the like. Judges may also allow trial by jury even for a
party who has waived that right by failing to demand one on time. 16' During the
trial itself, the judge has discretion regarding the number of jurors, the order of
trial (including possible bifurcation), the amount of time allocated for proof, and
159. See Robert M. Ackerman, Vanishing Trial, Vanishing Community? The Potential Effect of the
Vanishing Trial on America's Social Capital, 2006 J. DIsP. RESOL. 165.
160. Resnik, Morphing, supra note 49, at 805.
161. FED. R. CIv. P. 39(b).
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the form of the jury charge.1 62 The evidence rules also provide the judge with
substantial discretion, including discretion to present evidence without the consent
of the parties.'
63
Imagine instead a situation in which the judge was bound by the parties' con-
tract. Enforcing jury waivers actually increases the judge's power; enforcing a
whole menu of procedures limits it. The forum and applicable law were selected
by the parties; joinder and class actions would be prohibited; the quantity of dis-
covery and its time period would be set; confidentiality orders would be agreed to;
the length of the trial would be set; the jury would be unavailable, etc. Although
certain discretionary authority would inevitably remain, designer trial contracts
could remove from judges the power to make important decisions regarding the
management and determination of the case. Among other things, it would limit
the judge's discretion to exercise discretion to protect weaker parties. 64
Should courts, then, enforce contracts for process? The answer might be an
easy "yes" if we could be sure that the provisions were genuinely bargained for
and: 1) the parties had equal bargaining power; 2) the dispute was entirely be-
tween private parties; 3) the outcome of the dispute would affect only those par-
ties; 4) the courts were not asked to adopt procedures that would take time and
resources away from other court business; and 5) the process chosen was not an
affront to the dignity of the court. In such a situation, the private role of the courts
dominates and party autonomy could be given great weight without damage to
other values.
Most situations will be much murkier and, as a result, contracts for process
should not be automatically entitled to specific performance. As a creature of
equity, specific performance is within the discretion of the court. As such, it
should not be granted if the act that would be compelled is contrary to public pol-
icy.165 Therefore, the trial court should scrutinize the provisions, severally and as
a group, to determine their probable effect. In providing content to "public pol-
icy" in this context, the court should not be limited to the kind of extreme situa-
tions that render a contract "unconscionable." Instead, the question should be
whether enforcement of the contract would jeopardize the courts' ability to safe-
guard the public interest. More specifically, the court should consider the follow-
ing:
* whether the parties agreed to the terms knowingly, voluntarily, and intel-
ligently;' 
66
162. See FED. R. Civ. P. 42 (trial); 43 (time allocation); 48 (jurors); 49 (jury charge).
163. See, e.g., FED. R. EviD. 201(c) (court may take judicial notice); 614 (court may call and interro-
gate witnesses); 706 (court may appoint expert witnesses).
164. Weinstein, supra note 140, at 260.
165. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS §§ 357, 365 (1981).
166. In considering this issue, the courts should not employ a presumption in favor of validity like the
presumption in favor of arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act. That presumption stems from
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the FAA itself, and does not apply to litigation. Therefore,
courts should not rely on precedent under that Act finding assent merely because of the existence of
legible contract language. They could, however, employ insight from empirical research regarding
things like consumer understanding of contract terms in assuring themselves that assent to the terms
was meaningful. See Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REv. 233 (2002) (reporting that a high percentage of literate adults are unable to extract relevant
information from form contracts).
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" whether the parties' actual dispute is the type they contemplated at the
time of contracting;
" the importance of developing a body of public outcomes and case prece-
dent in the particular area of the law 167 and the importance of the jury's
participation in instantiating the values involved;'
6 8
" public interest in the subject matter of the dispute; 69
" the impact of the contract's terms on the ability of the plaintiff to meet
the burden of proof and the defendant to present a defense, including the
ability to gather information and the opportunity to present it to the finder
of fact;
" the comparative impact of the contract terms on the parties;
" the probable impact of the contract on the particular case's cost in terms
of time and money;
" the impact on this court's docket and systemic judicial efficiency more
generally; and
* the extent to which the chosen process protects the litigants' dignity
and ability to be heard.
Collectively, these factors seek to protect the parties' right of self-
determination, the development of legal rules, the educational and symbolic func-
tions of the courts, the accuracy of case outcomes, and the affordability of court
processes. 70 Before a contract for a customized trial should be enforced, the party
seeking enforcement must demonstrate that the factors above weigh strongly in
favor of the contractual procedures. The normative and political values support-
ing public adjudication 17 cannot be bargained away without the involvement of
anyone representing the public interest. The court, by carefully analyzing the
contract's effect, provides that public check on the private deal.
167. Professor Hadfield's discussion of the way the objectives for the operation of the legal system
vary depending on the kind of case involved can be quite helpful here. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Ex-
ploring Economic and Democratic Theories of Civil Litigation: Differences Between Individual and
Organizational Litigants in the Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1275, 1276
(2005).
168. See Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years War, 57 STAN. L.
REV. 1255, 1274 (2005) ("There is no formula that will yield the right number or percentage of trials.
But if we want a legal system in which judges and juries devise public standards and assess account-
ability, particularly that of powerful actors, we need enough trials to do that job.").
169. This would include factors such as whether the government is a party; whether the case involves
issues of public health or safety; whether other suits regarding the same subject are pending or likely to
be filed; and whether legitimate privacy interests would be threatened by public disclosure. In addi-
tion, no court record should be sealed unless the requirements for post-dispute sealing are met. See
discussion supra Part II.B, Confidentiality.
170. Different combinations of factors will be relevant depending on the terms of the contract and the
identity of the parties.
171. Professor Resnik summarizes these beliefs: "that the state is the appropriate central regulator of
conduct, that norm enforcement through transparent decisionmaking by state-empowered judges is
desirable, that public resources ought to be spent upon individual complaints of alleged failures to
comply with legal obligations, that litigants ought to be provided with opportunities to present proofs
and reasoned arguments, that the power of adjudicators can be controlled by obliging them to rely on
facts adduced on the record and to perform some of their duties in public, and that legitimate judg-
ments thus result." Resnik, Procedure, supra note 41, at 623-24.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Dispute resolution, including the part of it represented by the public court sys-
tem, is changing rapidly. Both public and private systems must respond to the
needs of disputing parties and the public at large. As the government monopoly
on dispute resolution weakens, it is tempting to change the court system to help
retain its market share, as it is important for public adjudication to be the domi-
nant player in creating and enforcing social norms. While the public system can
and should be flexible, it should not give up its distinctive values in an effort to
compete with private alternatives. Litigation may draw on lessons learned in al-
ternative methods of dispute resolution; ADR, in turn, may draw on lessons
learned from centuries of experience with traditional litigation. Decisions about
procedure should not, however, be made irrevocably based on pre-dispute bar-
gaining power, behind a veil of ignorance, by parties considering only themselves.
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